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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 
Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the sentences 
imposed for certain prior offenses, and for “offenses similar to 
them,” may not be counted in the calculation of an individual’s 
criminal-history score. U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c). One such offense 
is “[l]oitering.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2). Yet there is (and has 
long been) a great variety of loitering provisions in force across 
the United States, and it is unclear which of those laws impose 
a sentence excludable under the Guidelines. In United States v. 
Hines, 628 F.3d 101 (3d Cir. 2010), our Court went some way 
toward resolving this difficulty. “Loitering” in § 4A1.2(c)(2), 
we said, covers a class of offenses that we called “loitering 
simpliciter,” and it does not reach a separate class that we 
dubbed “loitering plus.” 628 F.3d at 108. We then held that the 
defendant’s sentence under the New Jersey law at issue—
which bars “wander[ing], remain[ing] or prowl[ing] in a public 
place with the purpose of unlawfully obtaining or distributing 
a controlled dangerous substance,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-
2.1(b)(1) (2019)—was countable because the offense is a form 
of loitering plus and, as applied to the defendant, was not 
sufficiently “similar to” the offenses that constitute loitering 
simpliciter. 
The present appeal asks us to decide this same question 
for a sentence under Pennsylvania’s anti-loitering statute, 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5506 (2019). Because that law is different 
from the New Jersey provision in important respects, we take 
this opportunity to clarify our understanding of “[l]oitering” in 
§ 4A1.2(c)(2).1 We conclude that loitering simpliciter under 
 
1 A panel of this Court has already confronted, in a not-
precedential opinion, the excludability of a sentence under § 
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the Guidelines encompasses all those offenses that do not 
require, either explicitly or by judicial interpretation, a purpose 
to engage in some type of unlawful conduct. On this 
understanding, we hold that the Pennsylvania law neither is a 
form of loitering simpliciter nor, as applied here, is sufficiently 
“similar to” the offenses that constitute that category. We 
accordingly will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
I 
Early one morning in December 2017, Tremayne 
James’s ten-year-old nephew found a loaded handgun in a 
kitchen drawer at his home. As he was examining it, the gun 
fired mistakenly. The bullet travelled through a wall and 
wounded the boy’s sister, James’s six-year-old niece, as she 
lay in bed. She made a full recovery, but police arrested James 
for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which bars possession 
of a firearm (that has travelled in interstate commerce) by those 
convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of 
incarceration. James pleaded guilty in July 2018, and a 
sentencing hearing was scheduled for early the following year. 
The Presentence Report recommended a term of 
imprisonment of between 84 and 105 months. It assigned 
James a criminal history score of 10, including two points for 
a 2011 state conviction for “loitering and prowling at night 
time.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5506 (2019). That offense is a third-
degree misdemeanor, id., which under Pennsylvania law is 
punishable by up to one year of incarceration, id. § 1104(3).2 
 
5506. See United States v. Carter, 536 F. App’x 294 (3d Cir. 
2013). Although we agree with Carter’s result, we expand 
upon its analysis. 
2 A subsequent drug offense in 2013 qualified James for the § 
922(g)(1) bar. 
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Although James initially received only sixty days’ probation, 
subsequent probation violations led to a sentence of 
imprisonment for up to nine months. The length of that 
sentence triggered the addition of the two points. See U.S.S.G. 
§ 4A1.1(b) (providing that two points are to be added for each 
prior sentence carrying a maximum term of imprisonment of 
between sixty days and one year and one month). 
At the sentencing hearing, James’s attorney objected. 
The Guidelines, she pointed out, provide that a sentence for 
“[l]oitering” and for all offenses “similar to” it should be 
excluded from the computation of the criminal-history score. 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2). The two points were significant. A 
criminal-history score of 8 would have placed James in 
category IV with a prescribed sentence of 70 to 87 months of 
imprisonment. U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. James’s criminal-history 
score of 10, however, put him in category V, leading to the 84-
to-105-month range ultimately recommended. 
The District Court overruled the objection and 
sentenced James to 105 months in prison, the top of his 
Guidelines range. Given this sentence, the two points for the 
loitering offense amount to at least an additional one and a half 
years in prison. James timely appealed. 
II3 
In order to decide whether the Guidelines require the 
exclusion of James’s sentence under § 5506, we must begin by 
determining the scope of “[l]oitering” in § 4A1.2(c)(2). Hines 
called this category “loitering simpliciter” and held that it does 
 
3 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, 
and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review 
of legal interpretations of the Guidelines is plenary. United 
States v. Jones, 740 F.3d 127, 132 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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not include offenses like that of New Jersey’s anti-loitering 
statute, which “requires a specific intent—subjectively held 
and objectively manifested—in addition to the mere act of 
wandering, remaining, or prowling in a public place.” 628 F.3d 
at 111; see also id. at 113 (describing loitering simpliciter as 
“ha[ving] no specific intent” element). Elsewhere, though, 
Hines suggested positive definitions of loitering simpliciter—
that it “is little more than suspiciously remaining in a public 
place,” id. at 111-12, and that “[a] person loiters, within the 
meaning of the Guidelines, merely by wandering, prowling, or 
remaining in a public place,” id. at 109. 
These statements should not be understood to describe 
loitering simpliciter’s ceiling—to exhaust all the possible 
offenses that make up that category. It is “a ‘fundamental 
canon of statutory construction’ that words generally should be 
‘interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common 
meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute.’” Wis. Cent. 
Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2018) (alteration 
omitted) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 
(1979)). This, as Hines said, demands that we give “[l]oitering” 
in § 4A1.2(c)(2) the meaning it possessed “when the [United 
States Sentencing] Commission drafted [and promulgated] the 
Guidelines” in 1987. 628 F.3d at 112. However, it is also a 
“cardinal principle of statutory construction . . . to save and not 
to destroy” a statute by “giv[ing] effect, if possible, to [its] 
every clause and word.” United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 
528, 538-39 (1955) (citations omitted). The Guidelines, 
therefore, must be construed as having incorporated, at the very 
least, the minimally constitutionally permissible form of a 
loitering offense, as that floor was understood at the time of 
their adoption. A review of the relevant history in turn leads to 
the conclusion that “[l]oitering” under the Guidelines 
encompasses more than offenses that simply criminalize 
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wandering, prowling, or remaining in a public place. It 
includes all those offenses, even those with a mens rea 
element, that do not require of their violator a purpose to 
engage in some form of unlawful conduct. 
A 
By the late 1980s, loitering and vagrancy laws in the 
United States had changed significantly from those in force 
only three decades earlier. A commonly noted feature of the 
earlier laws, as we suggested in Hines, was that they 
criminalized a person’s condition or status alone, eschewing 
the traditional requirements of a mens rea and an actus reus. 
As one commentator put it, the offenses were “defined in terms 
of being rather than in terms of acting.” Forrest W. Lacey, 
Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1203, 1204 (1953); see, e.g., Edelman v. California, 
344 U.S. 357 (1953) (analyzing Cal. Penal Code § 647(5) 
(Chase 1947), which bluntly declared that “[e]very idle, or 
lewd, or dissolute person[] . . . [i]s a vagrant, and is punishable” 
by fine and imprisonment); Soles v. City of Vidalia, 90 S.E.2d 
249, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1955) (confronting a Georgia city 
ordinance that made it “unlawful for any person to 
idle, loiter or loaf upon any of the streets, sidewalks, alleys, 
lanes, parks or squares of [the] City of Vidalia”). 
Laws such as these served predominantly to “permit 
wider police discretion in [the] arrest of persons suspected of 
having committed or of intending to commit a crime.” Note, 
Use of Vagrancy-Type Laws for Arrest and Detention of 
Suspicious Persons, 59 Yale L.J. 1351, 1352 (1950). They 
provided police a default legal basis to make an arrest where 
evidence was otherwise lacking. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-
Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. Pa. L. Rev. 603, 614-
15 (1956). As a result, they invited selective enforcement by 
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police officers, judges, and juries, with the burden commonly 
falling on disfavored racial and social groups. See Risa 
Goluboff, Vagrant Nation: Police Power, Constitutional 
Change, and the Making of the 1960s, at 15-20, 115-27 (2016). 
That reality, however, also brought the early loitering 
and vagrancy laws under sustained legal attack. These 
challenges came to emphasize, in addition to other arguments, 
two principles of the Supreme Court’s inchoate void-for-
vagueness doctrine: that the laws either failed to provide 
ordinary persons adequate notice of the prohibited conduct4 or 
permitted the arbitrary exercise of enforcement discretion.5 See 
id. at 140-42, 247; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-
for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 67, 76 (1960). Over time, this line of attack proved 
remarkably successful; by the late 1960s, increasing numbers 
of federal courts were invoking these principles to strike down 
vagrancy and loitering laws. See Goluboff, supra, at 253-57. 
The movement culminated in Papachristou v. City of 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). There, the Supreme Court 
invalidated, on these same two grounds, a Florida city 
 
4 See, e.g., Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451, 453 (1939) 
(“No one may be required at peril of life, liberty or property to 
speculate as to the meaning of penal statutes. All are entitled to 
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids.”). 
5 See, e.g., Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 (1940); 
(observing that “a penal statute . . . which does not aim 
specifically at evils within the allowable area of State control” 
“readily lends itself to harsh and discriminatory enforcement 
by local prosecuting officials”); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 
242, 263-64 (1937) (“The statute, as construed and applied, 
amounts merely to a dragnet . . . . No reasonably ascertainable 
standard of guilt is prescribed.”). 
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ordinance that criminalized those who “wander[] or stroll[] 
around from place to place without any lawful purpose or 
object.” 405 U.S. at 156 n.1. Just over a decade later, the Court 
reaffirmed this doctrine, declaring unconstitutional a 
California statute that, as interpreted by the state appellate 
court, required all persons “[w]ho loiter[] or wander[] upon the 
streets or from place to place without apparent reason or 
business” to provide a “credible and reliable” identification of 
themselves when asked to do so by a police officer. Kolender 
v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353 n.1, 355-56 (1983). The trouble 
with the statute, the Court emphasized, was that it “vest[ed] 
virtually complete discretion in the hands of the police to 
determine whether the suspect has satisfied the statute.” Id. at 
358. 
B 
It was in this context that the newly formed federal 
Sentencing Commission in the mid-1980s included 
“[l]oitering” among the offenses whose sentence should be 
excluded from a defendant’s criminal-history calculation. The 
vagrancy-law revolution had created a complex doctrinal 
landscape. Although hardly uniform before Papachristou, 
loitering laws grew increasingly diverse after that decision as 
state and local jurisdictions enacted provisions of greater 
specificity, and as defendants challenged existing laws on 
constitutional grounds. For our purposes here, we can identify 
two general categories of these offenses. Only the latter, we 
conclude, constitutes “[l]oitering” under § 4A1.2(c)(2). 
1 
The first category comprises those laws that either 
explicitly require a purpose to engage in some type of unlawful 
conduct (such as prostitution or drug trafficking) or have been 
authoritatively interpreted to possess such a scienter 
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requirement. By 1987, it was well established that a mens rea 
element could at least mitigate vagueness concerns. See, e.g., 
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 
455 U.S. 489, 499 & n.14 (1982); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 
U.S. 379, 395 (1979). Most importantly, with regard to 
vagrancy and loitering laws, Papachristou suggested that the 
requirement of “a specific intent to commit an unlawful act” 
could address the concern over lack of notice. 405 U.S. at 163; 
see also Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 102 (1945) 
(plurality opinion). As a result, in the years after Papachristou 
and Kolender, courts overwhelmingly upheld against 
constitutional challenge laws that made it illegal to loiter for 
the purpose of engaging in unlawful conduct.6 Some courts 
also interpreted loitering laws to possess such a mens rea 
requirement in order to avoid declaring them unconstitutional.7 
2 
The second category includes not only the sort of 
offenses invalidated in Papachristou and Kolender—which of 
course persisted until challenged8—but also offenses of greater 
 
6 See, e.g., Short v. City of Birmingham, 393 So.2d 518, 522 
(Ala. Crim. App. 1981); State ex rel. Williams v. City Court of 
Tucson, 520 P.2d 1166, 1170 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); People v. 
Superior Court, 758 P.2d 1046, 1055-56 (Cal. 1988) (en banc); 
City of Seattle v. Slack, 784 P.2d 494, 497 (Wash. 1989) (en 
banc); City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 457 
(Wis. 1980). But see People v. Gibson, 521 P.2d 774, 775 
(Colo. 1974) (en banc). 
7 See, e.g., State v. Evans, 326 S.E.2d 303, 307 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1985); City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1383 (Wash. 
1992) (en banc). 
8 Both shortly before and after Papachristou, courts commonly 
declared unconstitutional pure status offenses, such as those 
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specificity regarding the conduct they prohibited and the 
grounds for arrest, though nevertheless falling short of 
requiring a purpose to engage in unlawful conduct. In general, 
the laws of this latter group possessed two features. First, they 
described a circumstance-based offense, where conviction 
depended upon the existence of certain objective and often 
enumerated conditions. One especially common version, for 
example, penalized public loitering “in a manner [and/or] 
under circumstances manifesting the purpose” of engaging in 
a specified unlawful act, usually either prostitution or drug 
trafficking. See, e.g., Brown v. Municipality of Anchorage, 584 
P.2d 35, 36 (Alaska 1978); City of Akron v. Rowland, 618 
N.E.2d 138, 143 (Ohio 1993). The law would then provide a 
conjunctive or (more often) disjunctive list of circumstances 
“which may be considered in determining whether” such a 
purpose is manifest. See, e.g., Coleman v. City of Richmond, 
364 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1988). Second, the laws also 
frequently possessed a “stop and identify” element, preventing 
arrest until after the suspect had the opportunity to explain his 
or her conduct—with varying standards for whether the 
explanation was acceptable—and barring conviction if the 
explanation was true and the conduct lawful. See, e.g., Wyche 
v. State, 619 So.2d 231, 233 n.2 (Fla. 1993); Lambert v. City of 
Atlanta, 250 S.E.2d 456, 457 (Ga. 1978); see also Hiibel v. 
Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 183-84 (2004) 
(describing the relation of stop-and-identify statutes to 
traditional vagrancy and loitering laws). 
 
that criminalized loitering in a specified place. See, e.g., People 
ex rel. C.M., 630 P.2d 593, 597 (Colo. 1981) (en banc); Bullock 
v. City of Dallas, 281 S.E.2d 613, 614 (Ga. 1981); State v. 
Grahovac, 480 P.2d 148, 151 (Haw. 1971); State v. Stilley, 416 
So.2d 928, 929 (La. 1982). 
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State and federal courts divided on whether this sort of 
loitering offense was unconstitutional. Laws containing one or 
both of these features were occasionally upheld,9 but were also 
often invalidated on various grounds.10 An exception to this 
general pattern was the loitering provision of the Model Penal 
Code (MPC), which was adopted in several states and largely 
sustained against constitutional challenge.11 It contains both of 
the features described above: objective circumstances “which 
may be considered in determining whether . . . alarm [for the 
safety of persons or property] is warranted”; and a requirement 
that a person be allowed “to identify himself and explain his 
 
9 See, e.g., Lambert, 250 S.E.2d at 457 (rejecting due process 
and equal protection attacks but upholding the challenge on the 
basis of the Georgia Constitution’s uniformity clause); City of 
South Bend v. Bowman, 434 N.E.2d 104, 107 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1982); People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (N.Y. 1978); 
In re D., 557 P.2d 687, 690 (Or. Ct. App. 1976). 
10 See, e.g., Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 978 (M.D. 
Fla. 1983); Brown, 584 P.2d at 37; Wyche, 619 So.2d at 234; 
Christian v. City of Kansas City, 710 S.W.2d 11, 13 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1986); People v. Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355, 1360 (N.Y. 
1988); Rowland, 618 N.E.2d at 145; Profit v. City of Tulsa, 617 
P.2d 250, 251 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980); Coleman, 364 S.E.2d 
at 243-44; City of Bellevue v. Miller, 536 P.2d 603, 607 (Wash. 
1975) (en banc). 
11 See Watts v. State, 463 So.2d 205, 207 (Fla. 1985); Bell v. 
State, 313 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Ga. 1984); City of Milwaukee v. 
Nelson, 439 N.W.2d 562, 568 (Wis. 1989). Notably, however, 
some courts declared city ordinances patterned after the MPC 
provision unconstitutional in the wake of Kolender. See Fields 
v. City of Omaha, 810 F.2d 830, 833-34 (8th Cir. 1987); State 
v. Bitt, 798 P.2d 43 (Idaho 1990). 
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presence and conduct” before an arrest can be made. Model 
Penal Code § 250.6 (Am. Law Inst. 2018).  
“Loitering” in § 4A1.2(c)(2) of the Guidelines is best 
read to encompass this second category of loitering offenses—
all those that do not require, either explicitly or by judicial 
interpretation, a purpose to engage in some type of unlawful 
conduct. An offense properly called loitering simpliciter may 
therefore still possess a mens rea element, provided that 
element does not amount to a requirement of a conscious object 
to commit an unlawful act. Because loitering in 1987 was a 
diverse offense, and the line between constitutionality and 
unconstitutionality varied across jurisdictions, loitering 
simpliciter is most aptly defined in this negative manner. In 
order to give effect to the statutory text, and to lend, as far as 
possible, “certainty and fairness” to courts’ application of § 
4A1.2(c)(2) in sentencing proceedings, see Hines, 628 F.3d at 
109, this is the appropriate standard to mark the difference 
between loitering simpliciter and loitering plus. 
III 
We now turn to whether the offense defined in § 5506 
is “[l]oitering” under § 4A1.2(c)(2) of the Guidelines. The 
Pennsylvania statute provides: “Whoever at night time 
maliciously loiters or maliciously prowls around a dwelling 
house or any other place used wholly or in part for living or 
dwelling purposes, belonging to or occupied by another, is 
guilty of a misdemeanor of the third degree.” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5506 (2019). James contends that the offense described here 
constitutes loitering simpliciter because it is essentially 
equivalent to that of the MPC provision. He emphasizes their 
mens rea elements in particular: that “maliciously” amounts at 
most to a general-intent requirement, on a par with the MPC’s 
provision of loitering “in a manner not usual for law-abiding 
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individuals.” Model Penal Code § 250.6. We cannot accept this 
argument for two reasons. 
First, although the presence of the term “malice” in § 
5506 might on an independent inquiry have led to a different 
conclusion, Pennsylvania courts have construed the statute to 
require an affirmative purpose to commit an unlawful act. 
James is correct that malice in its traditional sense 
encompasses more than such a mental state. A person could 
commit malicious mischief, for example, simply “out of a spirit 
of wanton cruelty.” 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 
*243. And in the homicide context, Pennsylvania courts have 
long said that the term “comprehends not only a particular ill-
will, but every case where there is wickedness of disposition, 
hardness of heart, cruelty, recklessness of consequences, and a 
mind regardless of social duty, although a particular person 
may not be intended to be injured.” Commonwealth v. Drum, 
58 Pa. 9, 15 (1868); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Green, 347 
A.2d 682, 686 (Pa. 1975); Commonwealth v. Seibert, 622 A.2d 
361, 364 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); see also Rollin M. Perkins & 
Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law 857-59 (3d ed. 1982). 
Yet Pennsylvania courts have interpreted “maliciously” 
in § 5506 to require a mental state higher than gross 
recklessness or even knowledge that one’s conduct will cause 
a particular result. In Commonwealth v. Duncan, 321 A.2d 917 
(Pa. 1974), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld the statute 
against a post-Papachristou vagueness challenge by adopting 
an interpretation that read the term to require an “evil intent” 
and “a formed design of doing mischief to another or a wicked 
intention to do an injury to another.” 321 A.2d at 920 (citing 
and quoting in part Commonwealth v. McDermott, 11 Pa. D. & 
C.2d 601, 604 (1958) (quoting 34 Am. Jur. 682, § 2)). 
Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Dial, 285 A.2d 125 (Pa. 1971), 
the Court approvingly cited a Superior Court interpretation that 
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defined maliciously “to mean ‘(having) as its purpose injury to 
the privacy, person or property of another.’” 285 A.2d at 128 
(quoting Commonwealth v. De Wan, 124 A.2d 139, 141 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1956)). Subsequent Superior Court decisions have 
also adopted this interpretation. See Commonwealth v. Sewell, 
702 A.2d 570, 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997); Commonwealth v. 
Melnyczenko, 619 A.2d 719, 721-22 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992); 
Commonwealth v. Belz, 441 A.2d 410, 411 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1982). 
Second, § 5506 is a conspicuous exception to 
Pennsylvania’s adoption of the Model Penal Code’s other 
public-order provisions. Sections 5501-5510 of title 18 of the 
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes contain nine offenses 
currently in force; of these nine, only the language of the 
loitering offense in § 5506 does not substantially match that of 
its equivalent offense in the Model Penal Code.12 Compare, 
e.g., Model Penal Code § 250.7, with 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5507 
(2019). In fact, an early version of the bill that became the 
Pennsylvania General Assembly’s Crimes Code Act of 1972 
included the MPC’s loitering provision, see S. 455, Gen. 
Assemb., 1971 Sess., Printer’s No. 1379, at 157 (Pa. Nov. 29, 
1971), but it was later replaced by the existing Pennsylvania 
law, see S. 455, Gen. Assemb., 1971 Sess., Printer’s No. 1971, 
 
12 One noteworthy difference between the texts is that where 
the MPC uses the mens rea term “purpose,” the Pennsylvania 
statutes substitute the word “intent.” Compare Model Penal 
Code § 250.1(1), with 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5501 (2019). Under 
the MPC, when a material element of an offense involves “the 
nature of [a person’s] conduct or a result thereof,” the person 
“acts purposely with respect to [that] element” when “it is his 
conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause 
such a result.” Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(i). 
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at 148-49 (Pa. June 29, 1972). Maintenance of § 5506’s 
language, amid the substantial adoption of the MPC’s other 
public-order offenses, suggests a meaningful difference 
between the provisions. 
In sum, because Pennsylvania courts have construed § 
5506 to contain a mens rea element more akin to the MPC’s 
term “purposely,” see Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a), than to 
any such element that might be read into § 250.6, and because 
ordinary textual analysis suggests that the provisions should be 
interpreted as materially different, we conclude that § 5506 is 
not “[l]oitering” under § 4A1.2(c)(2) of the Guidelines. 
IV 
Although § 5506 is distinct from loitering simpliciter, 
we must still decide whether it is sufficiently “similar to” that 
class of offenses to warrant exclusion of James’s sentence from 
his criminal-history score. Under the Guidelines, a court 
should “never” count sentences for “offenses similar to” 
loitering simpliciter, “by whatever name they are known.” 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(2). Some courts have highlighted this 
language, thinking it supports considering any offense dubbed 
“loitering” to be at least similar to the “[l]oitering” offense 
contemplated by the Guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. 
Lock, 466 F.3d 594, 598-99, 602 (7th Cir. 2006). We disagree. 
To us, the proper focus of the inquiry should be not on the name 
of the offense, but rather on the features of which it is 
composed. We therefore give no weight to the fact that § 5506 
is called “Loitering and prowling at night time.” 
Our Court employs the multifactor, “common sense” 
approach recommended in the commentary to § 4A1.2 for 
deciding whether an offense is “similar to” those listed. Hines, 
628 F.3d at 110. There are five considerations: 
(i) a comparison of punishments imposed for the 
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listed and unlisted offenses; (ii) the perceived 
seriousness of the offense as indicated by the 
level of punishment; (iii) the elements of the 
offense; (iv) the level of culpability involved; 
and (v) the degree to which the commission of 
the offense indicates a likelihood of recurring 
criminal conduct. 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 12(A). We will address each of these 
factors, albeit in a different sequence than that of Hines, 
ultimately concluding that James’s sentence was properly 
counted in the calculation of his criminal-history score. 
A 
The first factor calls for a comparison of the offenses’ 
punishments. Section 5506 is a third-degree misdemeanor, 
which under Pennsylvania law is punishable by up to one year 
in prison. 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 106(b)(8), 1104(3) (2019). The 
government argues that this maximum possible sentence 
weighs in its favor because § 4A1.2(c)(1) provides that a 
sentence should be counted if it “was a term of probation of 
more than one year or a term of imprisonment of at least thirty 
days.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1). This point is inapposite. 
“Loitering” is listed under § 4A1.2(c)(2), not § 4A1.2(c)(1), 
and the linguistic identity of the beginning of these 
provisions—“Sentences for the following prior offenses and 
offenses similar to them, by whatever name they are known, 
are . . . .”—leads us to infer a meaningful variation in their 
subsequent language. Whereas § 4A1.2(c)(1) lists certain 
offenses and describes the type of sentences for those offenses 
that should be counted, § 4A1.2(c)(2) lists different offenses, 
the sentences for which should “never” be counted. If the 
Sentencing Commission, and by extension Congress, wanted 
to limit the excludable sentences of the § 4A1.2(c)(2) offenses 
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in the same way as it did for the § 4A1.2(c)(1) offenses, it 
would have done so. See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 
16, 23 (1983) (“Where Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.” (alteration and citation omitted)); Antonin Scalia 
& Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 170 (2012) (instructing that “a material variation in terms 
suggests a variation in meaning”). 
Our comparison of punishments, then, must look to the 
maximum sentences for the offenses that constitute loitering 
simpliciter. Notably, the MPC’s loitering offense is classified 
as a “violation,” Model Penal Code § 250.6, which is defined 
as “a noncriminal class of offenses . . . for which only a fine or 
other civil penalty is authorized,” Model Penal Code § 1.04 
explanatory note. Conviction of a violation does “not give rise 
to any disability or legal disadvantage based on conviction of 
a criminal offense.” Model Penal Code § 1.04(5). Further, 
although both Arkansas and Florida classify their MPC-based 
loitering laws as misdemeanors, they punish violations of those 
laws by up to thirty and sixty days in prison, respectively. See 
Ark. Code Ann. §§ 5-4-401(b)(3), 5-71-213(e) (West 2019); 
Fla. Stat. §§ 775.082(4)(b), 856.021(3) (2019). The exception 
to this pattern is Georgia, whose MPC-based provision is 
punishable by imprisonment of up to a year. See Ga. Code Ann. 
§§ 16-1-3(5), (9); 16-11-36(c) (2019).13 In general, then, the 
 
13 Other states with loitering provisions currently in force also 
tend to prescribe lighter maximum sentences. In New York, for 
example, loitering is punished as either a class B misdemeanor 
or a violation, depending upon the nature of the offense and 
whether it is a first offense. See N.Y. Penal Law §§ 240.35-.37 
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maximum punishment for a conviction under § 5506, a year in 
prison, would be at the highest end of the range of punishments 
allowable for offenses acknowledged to be forms of loitering 
simpliciter. 
The third and fourth factors direct our attention to the 
elements of the compared offenses, and in particular to the 
level of culpability they require. The circumstantial elements 
of these offenses are largely similar: § 5506 requires loitering 
or prowling “at night time . . . around a dwelling house or any 
other place used wholly or in part for living or dwelling 
purposes, belonging to or occupied by another,” while MPC § 
250.6—which we take here to be paradigmatic—demands 
loitering or prowling “in a place, at a time, or in a manner not 
usual for law-abiding individuals under circumstances that 
warrant alarm for the safety of persons or property in the 
vicinity.” If anything, § 5506 is more specific than the MPC 
provision in its predicate circumstances, providing greater 
clarity of the interdicted behavior and constraining more fully 
police discretion. 
Yet, despite this similarity, the scienter requirements 
distinguish § 5506 from loitering simpliciter. As noted, 
Pennsylvania state courts have interpreted the statute to 
prohibit an “intentional act, without legal justification or 
excuse, which has as its purpose injury to the privacy, person 
or property of another.” De Wan, 124 A.2d at 141. Loitering 
traditionally required no mental element at all—it was 
effectively a status offense, criminalizing who a person was 
 
(McKinney 2019). Class B misdemeanors are punishable by up 
to three months in prison, and violations by up to fifteen days. 
N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(1-a)(e)(2), (4). We take no position 
here on whether New York’s loitering laws are either loitering 
simpliciter or loitering plus. 
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rather than what he or she had done. Although Papachristou 
and the revolution it represented did away with these old laws, 
a mens rea of specific intent or purpose was not thereby 
declared constitutionally necessary. The result has been the 
panoply of offenses we have called loitering simpliciter. 
Section 5506, however, includes just such a mens rea 
requirement. 
B 
The remaining factors encompass those more subjective 
measures of similarity—the punishment actually imposed and 
the degree to which the defendant’s commission of the offense 
indicates a likelihood of recurring criminal conduct. See 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 12(A). These factors point in different 
directions. On the one hand, although James was initially 
sentenced to sixty days of probation, subsequent violations led 
him to be resentenced to a term of imprisonment of between 
three-and-a-half and nine months. In Pennsylvania, “[u]pon 
revocation [of probation,] the sentencing alternatives available 
to the court shall be the same as were available at the time of 
initial sentencing.” 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9771(b) (2019). The 
court “is free to impose any sentence permitted under the 
Sentencing Code” for the original crime. Commonwealth v. 
Wallace, 870 A.2d 838, 843 (Pa. 2005). As a result, James’s 
subsequent sentence indicates “the perceived seriousness,” 
U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. 12(A), of his violation of § 5506 at least 
as well as his initial sentence. And by this measure, it reflects 
a prison term in excess of the maximum punishment called for 
not only by the MPC but also by most of the states that have 
adopted the MPC’s loitering provision. On the other hand, 
however, the government concedes that the fifth factor—the 
indication of likely recidivism—counts in James’s favor. We 
see no reason to question that concession. 
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C 
Although by some measures both § 5506 and its 
application to James are indeed similar to the offenses that 
comprise loitering simpliciter, we nevertheless conclude that 
the balance weighs against him. For one, § 5506’s one-year 
maximum term of imprisonment is comparable only to the 
maximum punishment of a relative outlier in the range of 
punishments commonly available for violations of loitering 
provisions we acknowledge to constitute loitering simpliciter. 
Further, the sentence James received upon revocation of his 
probation also sits at the high end of that range. Finally, § 
5506’s mens rea requirement categorically distinguishes it 
from the “[l]oitering” offense listed in § 4A1.2(c)(2). 
Collectively, these considerations are sufficient to render the 
sentence imposed upon James for his violation of § 5506 
countable under the Guidelines. 
V 
For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the 
District Court. 
